What’s the Use?: Interpreting the Term
“Uses” in the Aggravated Identity Theft
Provision
Shang-Chi Andrew Liu†
The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act (ITPEA) increases penalties for
crimes that involve the unlawful use of another person’s identifying information. A
subsection of the ITPEA—the aggravated identity theft provision—imposes a mandatory two-year sentencing enhancement on a defendant who “uses” a means of identification of another person during and in relation to a predicate felony. Currently,
federal circuit courts disagree about whether the term “uses” in the statute is ambiguous and whether the rule of lenity should consequently apply to narrow its reach.
On the one hand, courts that have held the statute to be ambiguous apply the rule of
lenity to hold that a defendant qualifies for the enhancement only if the defendant
has directly impersonated another person. On the other hand, courts that have held
the statute to be unambiguous reason that the plain text of the statute demands that
the defendant need only generally misuse another’s information in the facilitation of
fraud.
This Comment argues that the rule of lenity is improper in the context of the
aggravated identity theft provision because a variety of interpretive tools are available and operative. For that reason, courts should apply the statute in accordance
with its broad plain meaning by construing “uses” as requiring only general misuse
of another person’s identifying information. This reading draws support from an
analogous case in a comparable criminal context, interactions between interpretive
canons, and legislative history found in the amendment notes to the ITPEA. This
reading also provides practical benefits for courts assessing these issues in a contemporary technological landscape rife with digital political dissent and vigilante
hacktivism.
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INTRODUCTION
In the cold open of an episode of The Office, Jim Halpert impersonates coworker Dwight Schrute by donning a cream-colored
shirt, wire-frame glasses, and middle-parted hair.1 Though he
meets the display with initial displeasure, Dwight eventually retorts that “imitation is the most sincere form of flattery.”2 Jim’s
antics ultimately prove overbearing, however, as Dwight goes on
to famously exclaim, “Identity theft is not a joke, Jim! Millions of
families suffer every year!”3
There is truth to Dwight’s words. According to a Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) report, identity crimes resulted in a loss
of $3.3 billion for U.S. consumers in 2020.4 The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated this problem by indirectly giving rise to
novel opportunities for identity-related scams,5 including stealing
federal stimulus payments, impersonating the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and peddling sham vaccinations. As

1

The Office: Product Recall (NBC Apr. 26, 2007).
Id.
3
Id.
4
FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK 5 (2020).
5
See Fraud Alert: COVID-19 Scams, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. OFF.
OF INSPECTOR GEN. (Feb. 2, 2022), https://perma.cc/57Z5-CK6G; Safia Samee Ali, Pop-Up
Covid Testing Sites May Be Rife for Identity Theft, Experts Say, NBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2022),
https://perma.cc/V9QC-EFKH; cf., Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Licensed Pharmacist
Charged with Hoarding and Price Gouging of N95 Masks in Violation of Defense Production Act (May 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/E3PE-TGP6.
2
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a result, the FTC received almost 1.4 million identity theft complaints in 2020, a 113% increase from the previous year.6
The United States had addressed the threat of identity
crimes for decades well before these contemporary developments.
During the technology boom of the late nineties, Congress enacted
the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 19987
(ITADA), which made identity theft a federal crime. Six years
later, Congress enacted the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement
Act of 20048 (ITPEA). A subsection of the ITPEA targets aggravated identity theft: the knowing transfer, possession, or use,
without lawful authority, of a means of identification of another
person during and in relation to a predicate felony.9 This aggravated identity theft provision imposes a mandatory two-year term
of imprisonment in addition to the punishment for the underlying
predicate felony.10
The aggravated identity theft provision is easy to apply in
simple cases but poses challenges in more complex scenarios. For
a simple example, consider a defendant—an IT employee of a
graduate program—who obtains the Social Security number of an
applicant through the program’s admissions portal. Without the
applicant’s consent, the defendant uses the Social Security number to impersonate the victim and obtain loans and lines of credit
in the victim’s name. In this case, the predicate felony of a false
statement under the Social Security Act11 is specifically enumerated under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c), thereby mandating the two-year
sentencing enhancement for identity crimes that occur during the
underlying offense.12 The means of identification at issue is the
Social Security number itself. Put another way, the IT employee
uses the applicant’s identification without lawful authority in relation to Social Security fraud, the associated predicate felony.
This situation embodies the traditional idea of identity theft—impersonation—and clearly qualifies as a “use” of a means of identification for purposes of the aggravated identity theft provision.
For a more complex example, consider a health-care fraud
scheme. An owner of a massage clinic makes an arrangement
6
Compare FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 7, with FED. TRADE COMM’N,
CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK 7 (2019).
7
Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007.
8
Pub. L. No. 108-275, 118 Stat. 831 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1028A).
9
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
10 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
11 Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
12 See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(11).
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with a physical-therapy company. Under the arrangement, the
owner amasses a set of customers and—with the customers’ consent—shares their Medicare information with the company. For
context, Medicare pays for physical therapy but does not pay for
massages. The company has a Medicare provider number that allows it to submit claims for payments. The parties agree that the
owner will supply the infrastructure of a clinic while the company
will bill Medicare for physical-therapy services that, in reality,
are luxurious massage sessions. In this case, the specific predicate felony is health-care fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(4).
The means of identification at issue is the Medicare information.
As a result of this practice, Medicare pays over $2.9 million to the
company, and the owner receives over $1.6 million.13
Several questions emerge in the second situation that did not
arise in the first. The owner did not impersonate the customers,
and his actions do not fall into the traditional understanding of
identity theft. But does the owner’s collection and sharing of customers’ Medicare information constitute “use” of a “means of identification of another person,” given the information’s general role
in facilitating the health-care fraud scheme? Or do the owner’s
actions fall outside the scope of the provision because the owner
did not attempt to directly pass himself off as the customers? In
addition, does the fact that the customers initially consented to
the sharing of their Medicare information have any bearing on
the outcome?
These questions have led to divergent approaches in the application of the aggravated identity theft provision in circuit
courts. Principally, the circuits disagree about whether the term
“uses” in the aggravated identity theft provision is ambiguous and
whether the rule of lenity should consequently apply to narrow
the statute’s reach. Under the minority interpretation followed by
the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, the term is indeed ambiguous and so the rule of lenity applies. Therefore, for a defendant to
use a means of identification of another person, the defendant
must directly impersonate another person. Under the majority interpretation followed by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits, however, the term is not ambiguous and so the rule

13 For a case that reflects this set of facts, see United States v. Hong, 938 F.3d 1040,
1043–45 (9th Cir. 2019). For additional discussion of the case, see Part II.A.1.
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of lenity does not apply. Accordingly, in order to violate the aggravated identity theft provision, the defendant need only generally misuse another’s information in the facilitation of fraud.
Some circuits also disagree about how to interpret the phrase
“another person,” though this issue arises in fewer cases and the
courts give this topic less attention. Under the minority interpretation followed by the Seventh Circuit, for a defendant to use a
means of identification of “another person,” the defendant must
steal the information from the victim. Under the majority interpretation followed by the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits,
however, the term “another person” can include those who consented to the defendant using their identifying information.
This Comment uses interpretive tools to determine how to
apply the aggravated identity theft provision, shedding new light
on these divergent approaches. First, I employ textual analysis
and examine Smith v. United States,14 an analogous case that has
wrangled with similar statutory language. I observe that, according to the surplusage canon, “uses” should have a meaning so as
not to duplicate the meanings of the other two verbs in the provision. Second, I draw upon the House Report and amendment
notes to the ITPEA, which support a broader interpretation of the
statute. Furthermore, as a matter of policy, the fact that the aggravated identity theft provision enumerates specific and limited
categories of predicate felonies quells the concerns that a broader
reading of the statute would result in its application to situations
beyond those that Congress had considered while drafting the
ITADA and the ITPEA.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an
overview of the ITADA and its shortcomings, describing how Congress attempted to bolster identity-crime laws through the
ITPEA. Part II outlines the divergent approaches at the circuit
level regarding both the ambiguity of the aggravated identity
theft provision’s language and the significance of the owner’s consent. Part III employs interpretive tools to determine how to apply the aggravated identity theft provision, arguing that applying
the rule of lenity is improper in this particular context. Part IV
examines the practical benefits of relying on the unambiguous,
though broad, meaning of the aggravated identity theft provision
as it applies to digital political dissent and vigilante hacktivism
in online ecosystems. Using the majority interpretation, courts

14

508 U.S. 223 (1993).
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are better equipped to employ the statute in a contemporary technological landscape.
I. BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT LAW
As noted above, identity crimes have long been threats to society. Part I.A provides the historical backdrop against which
Congress enacted the ITADA. Taken as a whole, this enactment
reflected Congress’s intent to develop and expand its legislation
regarding identity theft to adapt to a changing social and technological environment during the technology boom of the late nineties. Part I.B notes the shortcomings of the ITADA and how
Congress attempted to bolster identity theft laws through the
ITPEA. As a general matter, the ITPEA reflected Congress’s wariness of costly recidivism. The historical development of the
ITADA and ITPEA ultimately established the statutory and policy framework in which the aggravated identity theft provision
operates and continues to influence the way it should operate.
A. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act
Prior to Congress’s enactment of the ITADA in 1998, which
made identity theft a federal crime, prosecutors generally
charged identity-theft crimes under state law through false-personation statutes.15 These state statutes made it illegal to falsely
assume the identity of another to gain a benefit or avoid an expense. 16 Oftentimes, they were outdated and ill-equipped to deal
with technological advances—namely, new online financial
crimes, such as credit-card fraud, that the development of the internet enabled. Given that these online crimes often occurred
across state lines, the lack of a functioning and effective federal

15 See, e.g., Identity Theft and Financial Fraud, OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES (Oct.
2010), https://perma.cc/6X8A-PMVZ.
16 See, e.g., 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/17-2(a)(2.5) (2017) (“A person commits a false
personation when he or she knowingly and falsely represents himself or herself to be:
[ ]another actual person and does an act in such assumed character with intent to intimidate, threaten, injure, defraud, or to obtain a benefit from another.”); Fla. Stat. § 817.02(1)
(2021) (“Whoever falsely personates or represents another person, and in such assumed
character: [ ] [r]eceives any property intended to be delivered to that person, with intent
to convert the same to his or her own use . . . shall be punished as if he or she had been
convicted of larceny.”); N.Y. Penal Law § 190.23 (2014) (“A person is guilty of false personation when . . . he or she knowingly misrepresents his or her actual name, date of birth or
address to a police officer or peace officer with intent to prevent such police officer or peace
officer from ascertaining such information.”).
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law that addressed these crimes made it difficult to deter their
rapid proliferation.
In response, Congress passed the ITADA, which amended 18
U.S.C. § 1028 (the identity fraud provision) to bolster the laws
governing identity-related crime. Specifically, it authorized punishment for whoever “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses,
without lawful authority, a means of identification of another
person with the intent to commit . . . any unlawful activity that
constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony
under any applicable State or local law.”17 In this context, the
term “means of identification” refers to any document, name, or
number that may be used to identify a specific individual, including any government issued identification, biometric data, or electronic identification number.18 This offense can carry a maximum
term of fifteen years of imprisonment, a fine, and criminal forfeiture of any personal property used to commit the offense.19
From a legislative perspective, the ITADA sought to address
growing concerns associated with the rise of new technologies.20
According to the relevant Senate Report, the ITADA serves two
primary purposes: (1) “to extend [the identity fraud provision],
which criminalizes fraud in connection with identification documents, to cover the unlawful transfer and use of identity information” and (2) “to recognize the individual victims of identity
theft crimes, and establish their right to restitution to include all
costs related to regaining good credit or reputation.”21 The report
also noted that “criminals do not necessarily need a document to
assume an identity; often they just need the information itself to
facilitate these types of crimes.”22 Thus, by amending the identity
fraud provision, the drafters hoped that “this statute [would] keep
pace with criminals’ technological advances.”23

17

18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7).
18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7).
19 18 U.S.C. § 1028(b).
20 See President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Identity Theft and
Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 703 (Oct. 30, 1998) (“This legislation
will enable the United States Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
other law enforcement agencies to combat this type of crime, which can financially devastate its victims. . . . As we enter the Information Age, it is critical that our newest technologies support our oldest values.”).
21 S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4 (1998) (emphasis in original).
22 Id. at 5.
23 Id.
18
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Of particular note, the ITADA established identity theft as
an independent crime, a measure originally meant to combat individuals who stole others’ means of identification to extend their
own credit lines.24 While the law previously focused on credit
grantors that suffered monetary losses as the primary victims of
credit card fraud, the ITADA recognized individuals whose identities were stolen as victims who could now seek direct restitution
upon conviction of the perpetrator. In this way, the amended language of the identity fraud provision broadened the law’s scope to
encompass the losses of individuals in addition to those sustained
by banks and other financial institutions.
Consider a situation in which an actor uses the personal identifying information of a set of victims to obtain a sizable loan.
Before the ITADA, the perpetrator would be charged under falsepersonation statutes, among other violations, and any restitution
would only be available to the banks involved. The individual victims would have to spend considerable time restoring their credit
ratings and clearing their names but would not have any legal
recourse against the perpetrator.25 The ITADA, however, created
new mechanisms that provided for restitution for the individual
victims to compensate them for harms to reputation, inconvenience, and other consequences.26 To further help victims recover,
the ITADA also created the Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse,
an online fraud complaint database operated by the FTC.27
B. The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act
In 2004, Congress enacted the ITPEA to “address[ ] the growing problem of identity theft.”28 Although the ITADA recognized
identity theft as a federal crime and provided specific remedies,
it struggled to keep pace with the rapidly increasing use of the
internet and electronic devices as the United States entered the
24

See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1028.
For example, during a legislative hearing, factory worker Bob Hartle testified that
the felon who stole his identity taunted him over the phone by saying that “he would continue to pose as Hartle for as long as he wanted since using his identity was not a crime.”
S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 6 (1998). The felon “caused Hartle to suffer over $100,000 of credit
card debt, and bought homes and motorcycles in Hartle’s name before filing for bankruptcy, also in Hartle’s name.” Id.
26 See id. at 11 (“Restitution.—This provision legally acknowledges victims of identity theft by adding to section 1028 a requirement that victims who have suffered a pecuniary loss are entitled to mandatory restitution under 18 U.S.C. 3663A.”).
27 See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTITY THEFT PROGRAM OCTOBER 1998–SEPTEMBER 2003 (2003).
28 H.R. REP. NO. 108-528, at 3 (2004), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 779.
25
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Information Age.29 Following the September 11 attacks, there was
increased attention to identity theft because of potential security
threats. In 2003, a random sample conducted by the FTC suggested that ten million U.S. consumers were victims of identity
crimes that year.30 The FTC estimated that the loss to banks and
financial institutions was approximately $47.6 billion and the
costs to individual consumers was $5.0 billion.31
Observing these trends, Congress was concerned that the existing laws did not sufficiently deter repeat offenders, many of
whom used new technology that made it easier to collect other
people’s information.32 In response to these issues, Congress
passed the ITPEA to penalize aggravated identity theft, defined
as the use of the identity of another person in relation to the specific felony violations enumerated within the statute.33 These limited enumerated felony violations include, for example, theft of
public money, false personation of citizenship, and the misappropriation of other people’s Social Security benefits.34
The subsection of the ITPEA that sets this into motion is 18
U.S.C. § 1028A, which created the crime of aggravated identity
theft. Specifically, the aggravated identity theft provision establishes that “[w]hoever, during and in relation to [the predicate
felony], knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced
29 See Kurt M. Saunders & Bruce Zucker, Counteracting Identity Fraud in the Information Age: The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 661, 674–75 (1999) (noting that the ITADA “specifically recognizes identity theft as
a distinct crime of its own”).
30 H.R. REP. NO. 108-528, at 4 (2004), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780.
31 Id.
32 See id. at 3–4, as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 779–80.
33 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.
34 See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c). The full set of enumerated felonies is as follows: theft of
public money, property, or rewards under 18 U.S.C. § 641; theft, embezzlement, or misapplication by a bank officer or employee under 18 U.S.C. § 656; theft from employee benefit
plans under 18 U.S.C. § 664; false personation of citizenship under 18 U.S.C. § 911; false
statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6);
crimes relating to fraud or false statements under any provision other than 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A or 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7); mail, bank, and wire fraud under Chapter 63; nationality and citizenship fraud under Chapter 69; passport and visa fraud under Chapter 75;
obtaining customer information by false pretenses under § 523 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6823; willful failure to leave the United States after deportation and creation of counterfeit alien registration cards under § 243 or § 266 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1321; immigration offenses contained in Chapter 8 of Title II
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1321; and false statements relating to
Social Security.
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to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.”35 Put another way, engaging in an identity crime while also engaging in an enumerated
predicate felony triggers the enhancement. The statute tacks on
this two-year sentencing enhancement without adjusting or accounting for underlying terms of imprisonment or other enhancements.36
The enactment of the ITPEA was part of a broader trend of
federal actions meant to protect victims’ livelihoods and their financial reputations.37 During this time, federal agencies worked
with state officials to crack down on criminal networks responsible for much of the identity theft within the nation, and the Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse remained in full operation. Around
the same period, Congress enacted the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 200338 (FACTA), which gave consumers the
right to one free credit report a year from each of the major credit
reporting agencies. 39 FACTA also allowed consumers to implement fraud alerts in their credit files to stop identity-related
crimes at their inception and protect their credit ratings. 40 Moreover, the aggravated identity theft provision included a specific
enumerated predicate felony that criminalized the misdeeds of
commercial storehouses of financial data (e.g., banks and insurance companies), ensuring that institutional perpetrators who
abused their customers’ data served appropriate sentences.41
In addition to assessing the costs of identity theft to consumers and corporations, Congress took note of identity crime because
of its potential threat to national security. In the wake of the
35 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). While the language of the aggravated identity theft provision is basically the same as that of the identity fraud provision, some courts have highlighted that the former covers a discrete list of particularly problematic federal felonies.
See, e.g., United States v. Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d 496, 499 (1st Cir. 2011) (“The statutes
are [ ] distinguishable not by the method of procuring the means of identification, but by
the underlying criminal conduct that they respectively target.”).
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(3). Specifically, the statute provides that in determining
a term of imprisonment for the felony during which the perpetrator transferred, possessed,
or used the means of identification, “a court shall not in any way reduce the term to be
imposed for such crime so as to compensate for, or otherwise take into account, any separate term of imprisonment imposed or to be imposed for a violation of this section.” 18
U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(3).
37 See Statement by President George W. Bush upon Signing H.R. 1731 (July 15,
2004), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. S15 (“Identity theft harms not only its direct
victims but also many businesses and customers whose confidence is shaken. Like other
forms of stealing, identity theft leaves the victim poor and feeling terribly violated.”).
38 Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952.
39 Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952, 1956.
40 Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952, 1955–57.
41 See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(8).
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September 11 attacks, federal and state officials realized that terrorist organizations were increasingly employing stolen and fabricated identities to evade detection by law enforcement.42 Consequently, the aggravated identity theft provision also established
a five-year sentencing enhancement for whoever “during and in
relation to any [terrorism offense], knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification
of another person or a false identification document.”43
The ITPEA ultimately reflects the federal government’s deep
concern with the potential for high-stakes recidivism.44 According
to the relevant House Report, with just the ITADA in place,
“many identity thieves receive[d] short terms of imprisonment or
probation; after their release, many of these thieves [went] on to
use false identities to commit much more serious crimes.”45
Congress attempted to address this issue with the mandatory
sentencing enhancement in the aggravated identity theft provision, which “provides enhanced penalties for persons who steal
identities to commit terrorist acts, immigration violations, firearms offenses, and other serious crimes.”46
II. DIVERGENT APPROACHES AT THE CIRCUIT LEVEL
Earlier case law involving the ITPEA set the stage for the
conflict that this Comment addresses. In Flores-Figueroa v.
United States,47 the Supreme Court held that the aggravated
identity theft provision “requires the Government to show that
the defendant knew that the ‘means of identification’ he or she
unlawfully transferred, possessed, or used, in fact, belonged to
‘another person.’” 48 The Court’s holding was limited to clarifying
the statute’s mens rea requirement,49 however, and did not address the scope of the term “uses.” Thus, lower courts were left to

42

See H.R. REP. NO. 108-528, at 4, as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780.
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(2).
44 Cf. Statement by President George W. Bush upon Signing H.R. 1731, supra
note 37 (“The bill I’m about to sign sends a clear message that a person who violates another’s financial privacy will be punished. . . . It reflects our Government’s resolve to answer serious offenses with serious penalties.”).
45 H.R. REP. NO. 108-528, at 3, as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 779.
46 Id.
47 556 U.S. 646 (2009).
48 Id. at 647 (emphasis omitted).
49 Shortly after the Supreme Court clarified this heightened mens rea requirement,
there was an influx of student pieces that investigated the Court’s decision as it related to
immigration reform. See generally, e.g., Sean C.H. Flood, Note, Of I.C.E. and Mens Rea:
43
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determine whether the aggravated identity theft provision applies to merely identity theft or to all identity fraud. This
Comment defines identity theft as stealing the identity of another
person and directly impersonating that person and identity fraud
as generally misusing another’s means of identification in the facilitation of fraud, which includes identity theft.
Circuits are split over whether the aggravated identity theft
provision requires identity theft or merely identity fraud. First,
and principally, circuits have disagreed about whether the term
“uses” in the aggravated identity theft provision is ambiguous and
whether the rule of lenity should consequently apply to narrow
the statute’s reach to cover only direct impersonation. Second, the
circuits disagree about whether the provision’s reference to the
use of the means of identification of “another person” requires
that the defendant steal the personal information from the victim.
In other words, they disagree about whether the phrase refers exclusively to someone who has not consented to the use of the information.
A. Ambiguity of the Term “Uses”
1. Minority interpretation: impersonation.
The Sixth, First, and Ninth Circuits have held that the term
“uses” is ambiguous, thereby allowing courts to apply the rule of
lenity and narrowly interpret the provision to cover only identity
theft. Accordingly, for a defendant to “use” a means of identification of another person, the defendant must directly impersonate
another person.
The Sixth Circuit first advanced this interpretation in United
States v. Miller.50 The criminal scheme in Miller centered on the
purchase of a parcel of real estate as an investment property.51 To
buy the land, David Miller formed a limited liability company
(LLC) and recruited investors for funding.52 When Miller failed to
raise the necessary amount, he obtained a loan from a bank and
Illegal Immigration and the Knowledge Requirement of the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 323 (2009); Matthew T. Hovey, Comment, Oh, I’m Sorry,
Did That Identity Belong to You? How Ignorance, Ambiguity, and Identity Theft Create
Opportunity for Immigration Reform in the United States, 54 VILL. L. REV. 369 (2009);
John P. Wixted, Note, Unknowing Thieves: Reforming the Legal Link Between Immigration and Identity Theft, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 403 (2009).
50 734 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2013).
51 Id. at 534.
52 Id.
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pledged the property that the LLC sought to acquire as collateral.53 To do so, however, Miller falsely represented that all the
named investors were present at a meeting and unanimously
voted to pledge the property as collateral.54 Although Miller did
not directly impersonate others—he simply misrepresented that
they were present—the government argued that he used the investors’ names when he “converted their names to his service” by
saying that they did something that they in fact did not do.55 Because the trial court found Miller guilty of the predicate felony of
making false statements to a bank under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(4),
the trial court also applied the aggravated identity theft provision
to his sentence.56
The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentencing enhancement under
the aggravated identity theft provision. Specifically, the Sixth
Circuit held that the rule of lenity applied because there were
“two reasonable interpretations of ‘uses’ and no conclusive guidance from the legislative history or case law.”57 The court first
determined that the plain meaning of “use,” as defined in dictionaries, is “‘[t]o convert to one’s service,’ ‘to employ,’ ‘to avail oneself
of,’ and ‘carry out a purpose or action by means of.’”58 Under this
reading, Miller’s misuse of the investors’ names would fall into
the generic “use” that the aggravated identity theft provision arguably criminalized.59
But the court also found support for Miller’s position that, in
this statutory context, “one ‘uses’ a person’s name . . . only if one
either passes himself off as that person or acts on behalf of that
person.”60 Specifically, the court utilized the canons of noscitur a

53

Id.
Id. at 535.
55 Miller, 734 F.3d at 540.
56 Id. at 536.
57 Id. at 542; see also id. at 541–42 (“Unfortunately, there is nothing in the legislative
history to indicate conclusively that Congress intended § 1028A to cover defendants falsely
claiming that other individuals did things that they actually did not do. . . . [The relevant
House Report] is brief and does not address the exact interpretive question presented.”).
58 Id. at 540 (quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (alteration in
original)); see also Use, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
59 Miller, 734 F.3d at 540. The government adopted this logic and conceded that,
under this position, “if there is any false statement about authority, which necessarily
involves the ‘use’ of someone’s name, made in connection with a predicate offense under
§ 1028A(c), the government can always charge aggravated identity theft in addition to the
underlying offense.” Id. at 540–41 (emphasis in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)).
60 Id. at 541 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)). Miller further argued that his conduct
did not constitute use of others’ names because “he did not steal or possess their identities,
54
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sociis61 and ejusdem generis62 to note that “the broad, dictionary
definition of ‘uses’ is narrowed by its placement near and after
‘transfers’ and ‘possesses,’ both of which are specific kinds of
use.”63 First, the noscitur a sociis canon suggested that the meaning of “uses” should draw from the meanings of the adjacent
words “transfers” and “possesses.” Second, the ejusdem generis
canon meant that because “uses”—a general term—came after
more specific verbs in statutory enumeration, “uses” should only
embrace a meaning that is aligned with those of the preceding
specific verbs.
Informed by these interpretive canons, the court reasoned
that the term “uses” must have practical boundaries, especially
in situations where the only means of identification at issue is a
name.64 In doing so, the court implied that there was merit in
viewing impersonation as an aptly narrowed form of use in this
particular context, though because Miller’s case did not involve
impersonation, the opinion did not provide further guidance on
the matter.65 Under this more limited reading, Miller did not “use”
the investors’ names by “merely lying about what they did.”66
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit—presented with two reasonable interpretations of “uses”—found the provision ambiguous, applied
the rule of lenity, and resolved the matter in favor of Miller.67
The First Circuit found the reasoning in Miller persuasive. In
United States v. Berroa,68 the First Circuit analyzed the aggravated identity theft provision in the context of mail-fraud conspiracy. Berroa sought admission to practice medicine in Puerto Rico
but failed to pass a required exam.69 As a result, he enlisted the
help of an employee of the Puerto Rico Board of Medical Examiners, who falsified passing test scores in his file.70 When Berroa
impersonate them or pass himself off as one of them, act on their behalf, or obtain anything
of value in one of their names.” Id.
61 See Noscitur a sociis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“[T]he meaning of
an unclear word or phrase . . . should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it.”).
62 See Ejusdem generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“[W]hen a general
word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to
include only items of the same class as those listed.”).
63 Miller, 734 F.3d at 541 (emphasis in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)).
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 542.
68 856 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 2017).
69 Id. at 147.
70 Id. at 147–48.
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entered medical practice as a doctor, he issued prescriptions to
his patients.71 As such, the government alleged that the use of patient names and addresses on the prescriptions for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(5) constituted use without lawful
authority of the identification of another person because Berroa
was not properly admitted to practice medicine and therefore
could not lawfully issue prescriptions.72
The First Circuit vacated Berroa’s convictions for aggravated
identity theft, reasoning that legislative history supports a narrower interpretation of “uses.”73 As a preliminary matter, the
First Circuit defined the rule of lenity as a rule of statutory construction that “requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.”74 Looking to
the text, the court found the statutory language ambiguous, recognizing that “‘use’ cannot be given its broadest possible meaning, which would subsume the separate statutory terms
‘transfer[ ]’ and ‘possess[ ].’” 75 Looking to legislative history, however, the court noted that the government’s broad interpretation
“could encompass every instance of specified criminal misconduct
in which the defendant speaks or writes a third party’s name,”
thereby leading to “extreme result[s]” not intended by Congress.76
Thus, the court gave considerable weight to legislative history
and held in favor of a narrower reading of “uses.” Accordingly, the
court “read the term ‘use’ to require that the defendant attempt
to pass him or herself off as another person or purport to take
some other action on another person’s behalf.”77
The Ninth Circuit also falls into the minority camp. In United
States v. Hong,78 the Ninth Circuit analyzed the aggravated identity theft provision as applied to health-care fraud. Hong owned
and operated three massage and acupuncture clinics in Southern
California.79 He made an arrangement with physical-therapy
companies under which he would amass a set of customers, tell
those customers that Medicare would cover the costs of massage
and acupuncture sessions, and—with the customers’ consent—
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 155.
Id.
See Berroa, 856 F.3d at 155–56, 157 n.8.
Id. at 157 n.8 (quoting United States v. Gray, 780 F.3d 458, 468 (1st Cir. 2015)).
Id. at 156 (alterations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)).
Id.
Id. at 156–57.
938 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1044.
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share their Medicare information with the companies.80 The companies had Medicare provider numbers that allowed them to submit claims for payments, notwithstanding the fact that Medicare
usually does not cover massages or acupuncture.81 The parties
agreed that Hong would supply a clinic, while the companies
would bill Medicare for physical-therapy services that, in reality,
were massage and acupuncture sessions.82 At trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts, including two counts of aggravated identity theft.83
The Ninth Circuit reversed. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
held that the rule of lenity applied and that Hong “did not ‘use’
[others’] identities within the meaning of the aggravated identity
theft statute.”84 The court focused on the fact that Hong provided
massage services to patients to treat their pain and then misrepresented those treatments as Medicare-eligible physical-therapy
services.85 Therefore, the court concluded that, while Hong and
his accomplices’ conduct ran afoul of other statutes, they did not
attempt to “pass themselves off as [others].”86 This succinct statement from the Ninth Circuit aptly summarizes the minority interpretation of the aggravated identity theft provision.
2. Majority interpretation: general misuse.
The Fifth, Fourth, D.C., Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits, on
the other hand, have held that the term “uses” is not ambiguous.
They therefore do not apply the rule of lenity, and consequently
interpret the provision’s meaning broadly. Accordingly, for a defendant to use a means of identification of another person, the
defendant need only generally misuse another’s information in
the facilitation of fraud. This interpretation includes conduct beyond direct impersonation.
The Fifth Circuit concisely spelled out this interpretation in
United States v. Mahmood.87 Mahmood was a licensed physician

80

Id.
Id.
82 Id. (“When therapists asked Hong about providing patients with [actual] physical
therapy, Hong told them [that] the patients prefer massages and might stop coming to the
clinics if made to exercise.”).
83 Hong, 938 F.3d at 1045.
84 Id. at 1051.
85 Id.
86 Id. (quoting Berroa, 856 F.3d at 156).
87 820 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2016).
81
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who owned a number of hospitals in Texas.88 He committed
health-care fraud by secretly altering Medicare reimbursement
claims: he replaced patients’ basic primary diagnoses with their
more complex secondary diagnoses, which resulted in $143,608 in
overpayments .89 He did not directly impersonate the patients but
rather used their means of identification in perpetuating a fraud
scheme.
Still, the Fifth Circuit held that the provision “d[id] not require actual theft or misappropriation of a person’s means of identification as an element of aggravated identity theft.”90 The court
reasoned that the provision was unambiguous and that it “plainly
criminalizes situations where a defendant gains lawful possession of a person’s means of identification but proceeds to use that
identification unlawfully and beyond the scope of permission
granted.”91 Unlike the courts that subscribe to the minority position, the Fifth Circuit stated that because of the weight of the
plain meaning of the provision, it need not resort to traditional
canons of statutory interpretation or legislative history to discern
Congress’s intent.92 Put another way, while the minority and majority positions arrive at similar conclusions regarding the plain
meaning of the word “uses,” the majority approach does not perceive the provision as blurring the word’s plain meaning and
therefore does not rely on other interpretive considerations.
The Fourth Circuit set forth a similar position in United
States v. Abdelshafi.93 In Abdelshafi, the Fourth Circuit applied
the aggravated identity theft provision in the context of healthcare fraud. Mohamed Abdelshafi operated a third-party vendor
for medical transportation services and contracted with a health
maintenance organization (HMO) to drive Medicaid patients to
and from health facilities in Virginia.94 The HMO gave Abdelshafi
a daily log with patients’ Medicaid identification numbers and
trip details.95 Abdelshafi used the personal information on the
claim forms to charge the HMO for trips that did not occur and
fraudulently overbilled the HMO by over $300,000.96 The trial
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at 182.
See id. at 184.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 187–88.
Mahmood, 820 F.3d at 188.
592 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 605.
Id.
Id.
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court convicted Abdelshafi on fifteen counts of health-care fraud
and two counts of aggravated identity theft. 97
The Fourth Circuit affirmed and, through a plain meaning
analysis, held that the aggravated identity theft provision unambiguously “prohibit[ed] an individual’s knowing use of another
person’s identifying information without a form of authorization
recognized by law.”98 The court reasoned that while Abdelshafi
“had authority to possess the [identifying information], he had no
authority to use [it] unlawfully so as to perpetuate a fraud.”99 In
addition, the court rejected Abdelshafi’s policy argument that
every instance of health-care fraud related to provider payments
would constitute aggravated identity theft.100 That this sliver of
health-care fraud—which implicated individuals’ privacy and security interests in medical services and thus justified increased
punishment—would always fall within the statute’s scope was
“not particularly noteworthy” to the court.101 Thus, the court “decline[d] to narrow the application of § 1028A(a)(1) to cases in
which an individual’s identity has been misrepresented.”102
The D.C. Circuit arrived at a similar conclusion in United
States v. Reynolds.103 Reynolds was the chief financial officer of a
church and swindled the institution out of more than $850,000.104
He extended the church’s line of credit at a bank by copying and
pasting church officers’ digital signatures, to which he had access,
to create false increased-borrowing approval letters.105 The trial
court found Reynolds guilty of bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, among other violations.106
The D.C. Circuit affirmed and held that “the statute [was]
clear” and that the phrase “‘use[ ] . . . without lawful authority’
easily encompasse[d] situations in which a defendant gains access

97

Id. at 604.
Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d at 609.
99 Id. (emphasis omitted).
100 Id. at 609–10 (“We adhere to the principle that ‘[f]ederal crimes are defined by
Congress, and so long as Congress acts within its constitutional power in enacting a criminal statute, this Court must give effect to Congress’ expressed intention concerning the
scope of conduct prohibited.’” (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 939
(1988) (alteration in original))).
101 Id. at 609.
102 Id.
103 710 F.3d 434 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
104 Id. at 435.
105 Id.
106 Id.
98
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to identity information legitimately but then uses it illegitimately—in excess of the authority granted.”107 The court explicitly
rejected Reynolds’s argument that “use” in the provision requires
the stealing of information, accepting that because “[t]he statutory text [was] unambiguous,” other interpretive tools like legislative history could not be used to support his argument.108 The
court’s decision made no mention of impersonation, perhaps as a
consequence of never reaching the question of if Reynolds “stole”
the church officer’s identity information.109 In other words, it did
not matter that Reynolds did not directly impersonate the church
officers by assuming their identities or stepping in their shoes;
digitally fabricating their approval of the transactions was
enough to qualify as a “use” of identity information. The outcome
of this case contrasts with that in Miller, which involved a similar
set of facts regarding representations and authorization.
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the reasoning of Reynolds in
United States v. Munksgard.110 Matthew Munksgard knowingly
made a false statement to obtain a loan from a bank insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.111 In doing so, “he
forged another person’s name to a surveying contract that he submitted to a bank in support of his loan application.”112 The court
transparently teed up both the issue at hand and its stance on the
matter:
The question before us is whether Munksgard’s conduct qualifies as a prohibited “use[ ]” within the meaning of
§ 1028A(a)(1). Munksgard insists that we should cabin the
meaning of “use[ ]” to crimes in which the accused attempted
to impersonate, or act “on behalf of,” someone else. We disagree. Plain meaning, statutory context, and existing precedent all show that Munksgard “use[d]” his victim’s means of
identification when he employed that person’s signature to
obtain the loan and thereby converted the signature to his
own service.113

107

Id. at 436 (alterations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)).
Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 436.
109 Id. at 435–36 (declining to determine whether Reynolds stole identity information
because it was unnecessary based on the plain meaning of the statute).
110 913 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2019).
111 Id. at 1329.
112 Id. at 1330.
113 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)).
108
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The court also reasoned that “use” in other criminal statutes
supported the plain language reading that the term entails “employing or converting an object to one’s service.”114 Like in
Reynolds, the court here implicitly suggested that Munksgard
had not directly impersonated the other person when forging his
name because he had not held himself out as that person to another entity; rather, he had fabricated approval of the transaction. Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit found that the provision’s
cross references to 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c) supported a more expansive reading of the term “uses.”115
The Eighth Circuit took a stronger stance against the application of the rule of lenity in United States v. Gatwas.116 Lony
Gatwas was a Des Moines tax agent who prepared personal income tax returns for his clients that “obtained inflated refunds by
falsely claiming dependents, including returns that reported several of Gatwas’s eight children as dependents of his clients.”117
The trial court sentenced him to forty-five months for wire and
tax fraud as well as aggravated identity theft.118 On appeal,
Gatwas argued that the trial court erred because the aggravated
identity theft provision “requires proof that he stole or assumed
the identity of another person.”119
The Eighth Circuit “reject[ed] Gatwas’s argument that the
statute [was] ambiguous and the rule of lenity therefore applie[d].”120 In doing so, the court observed that multiple prior decisions in its sister circuits had “upheld [aggravated identity
theft] convictions where the defendant neither stole nor assumed
the identity of [ ] [an]other person.”121 Furthermore, the court
noted that many of its sister circuits had “construed the word
‘use[s]’ broadly, relying on the statute’s causation element—that
114 Id. at 1335 (citing opinions that more broadly define the term “use” in the context
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2), and U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.4).
115 Munksgard, 913 F.3d at 1335 (“While these references may not foreclose an impersonation-based ‘on behalf of’ reading, they also don’t preclude—and on balance, we
think they support—an interpretation of ‘use[ ]’ that more broadly forbids one from ‘employ[ing]’ or ‘convert[ing] to [his] service’ another’s name.” (alterations in original) (quoting
Use, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1944))).
116 910 F.3d 362 (8th Cir. 2018).
117 Id. at 364.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 368 n.2.
121 Gatwas, 910 F.3d at 365 (first citing United States v. White, 846 F.3d 170, 177–78
(6th Cir. 2017); then citing Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 435–36; and then citing United States v.
Dvorak, 617 F.3d 1017, 1024–27 (8th Cir. 2010)).
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the use be during and in relation to an enumerated felony—to
limit its scope.”122 Therefore, the court reasoned that circuit case
law made clear that “no ‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty’ in the
statute warrant[ed] application of the rule of lenity in this
case.”123
B. Significance of the Owner’s Consent
A related but distinct issue is whether the use of the means
of identification of “another person” requires the defendant to
have stolen the personal information from the victim. That is, the
circuits disagree over whether the phrase refers exclusively to an
owner who did not consent to said use.
The Seventh Circuit is the sole proponent of the minority interpretation. Specifically, in United States v. Spears,124 the court
reviewed the convictions of a defendant who was in the business
of selling counterfeit credentials such as handgun permits and
drivers’ licenses.125 The court reversed the conviction under the
aggravated identity theft provision:
“[A]nother person” is ambiguous: neither text nor context
tells us whether “another” means “person other than the defendant” or “person who did not consent to the information’s
use.” That § 1028A deals with identity theft helps resolve the
ambiguity in favor of the latter understanding, while reading
“another person” to mean “person other than the defendant”
treats § 1028A as forbidding document counterfeiting and
other forms of fraud, a crime distinct from theft.
In other words, the court held that the provision “uses ‘another
person’ to refer to a person who did not consent to the use of the
‘means of identification.’” 126 In this case, “[p]roviding a client with
a bogus credential containing the client’s own information is identity fraud but not identity theft; no one’s identity has been stolen

122 Id. (first citing United States v. Michael, 882 F.3d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 2018) (“The
salient point is whether the defendant used the means of identification to further or facilitate the . . . fraud.”); and then citing United States v. Otuya, 720 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir.
2013) (“[A] defendant who uses the means of identification of another ‘during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated’ in the statute necessarily lacks a form of authorization recognized by law.”)).
123 Id. at 368 n.2 (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998)).
124 729 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2013).
125 Id. at 754.
126 Id. at 758.
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or misappropriated.”127 Accordingly, for a defendant to use a
means of identification of “another person” under the Seventh
Circuit’s interpretation, the defendant must steal the information
from the victim.
In contrast, the Ninth, Eighth, and Fourth Circuits have held
that “another person” does not exclusively refer to an owner who
did not consent to said use. Accordingly, for a defendant to use a
means of identification of “another person,” the defendant need
not have stolen the information.
In United States v. Osuna-Alvarez,128 the Ninth Circuit held
that, under a plain meaning analysis, “regardless of whether the
means of identification was stolen or obtained with the knowledge
and consent of its owner, the illegal use of the means of identification alone violates § 1028A.”129 Moreover, in United States v.
Hines,130 the Eighth Circuit held that a defendant acts unlawfully
regardless of whether the defendant has used another’s name
without permission or has obtained consent, emphasizing that
consent is not pertinent to the inquiry of whether the perpetrator
used the name in connection to a predicate felony.131 In addition,
in United States v. Otuya,132 the Fourth Circuit held that “one does
not have ‘lawful authority’ to consent to the commission of an unlawful act. Nor does a ‘means of identification’ have to be illicitly
procured for it to be used ‘without lawful authority.’” 133 While the
significance of the owner’s consent is not the focal point of this
Comment, it has important implications for how courts should interpret the aggravated identity theft provision in more modern,
technological contexts.
III. INTERPRETING THE AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT
PROVISION
This Part uses interpretive tools to determine how to apply
the aggravated identity theft provision. Part III.A employs textual analysis and also examines Smith, an analogous case that

127

Id. at 756.
788 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
129 Id. at 1185–86.
130 472 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by FloresFigueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009).
131 See id. at 1040.
132 720 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2013).
133 Id. at 189 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)).
128
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wrangled with statutory language similar to the aggravated identity theft provision. In general, courts assessing terminology in
similar statutory contexts have also focused on the broad ordinary
meaning of the term “uses.” This helps to clarify the discrepancies
between the minority and majority camps with respect to textual
interpretation. In addition, the surplusage canon counters the
canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, granting “uses” a
different meaning to avoid duplicating the meaning of the other
two verbs in the statute.
The remaining Sections use additional materials to expand
on these points. Part III.B draws on the House Report and
amendment notes to the ITPEA, explaining that the specific references to identity fraud and identity theft in legislative history
and statutory context mean that Congress did not intend to limit
the aggravated identity theft provision to only cases of identity
theft and direct impersonation. Moreover, as a matter of policy,
the fact that the aggravated identity theft provision enumerates
specific categories of predicate felonies quells the concern that a
broad reading of the provision would result in its application to
situations beyond which Congress had originally considered while
drafting the ITADA and the ITPEA. Part III.C then argues that
the application of the rule of lenity is improper in the context of
the aggravated identity theft provision.
A. Textual Interpretation
1. The plain meaning of “uses.”
In approaching this issue from a textual perspective, it is
helpful to further examine the four decisions from Part II.A.1 that
emphasized the ordinary meaning and dictionary definition of
“uses” in the aggravated identity theft provision. As a preliminary
matter, the Supreme Court has recognized that the term “‘use[s]’
poses some interpretational difficulties because of the different
meanings attributable to it.”134 It is unsurprising, then, that while
the four cases all arrive at comparable conclusions when
analyzing the term in isolation, they subsequently diverge on the
interpretive strength of the plain meaning vis-à-vis the statutory
context. Predictably, this divide falls in line with whether the
courts subscribe to the impersonation or general-misuse interpretation.
134

Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995).
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Circuits in the impersonation camp have sought to balance
the plain meaning with statutory context. For example, in Miller,
the Sixth Circuit stated that, “[d]efined in isolation from its statutory context, the dictionary meaning of the word ‘use’ is ‘“[t]o
convert to one’s service,” “to employ,” “to avail oneself of,” and “to
carry out a purpose or action by means of.”’” 135 Nonetheless, the
court went on to explain that the “meaning of statutory language,
plain or not, depends on context,” ultimately holding that the context of the aggravated identity theft provision produced two
equally reasonable interpretations of “uses.”136 Similarly, in
Berroa, the First Circuit noted that the “statute at issue here
fail[ed] to provide a specific definition” for “use” and outlined the
risks associated with giving the term its broadest possible meaning.137
In contrast, circuits in the general-misuse camp have been
more comfortable allowing the plain meaning to speak for itself.
For example, in Abdelshafi, the Fourth Circuit observed that the
Supreme Court previously indicated in its discussion of
§ 1028A(a)(1) in Flores-Figueroa that “[n]o special context is present here.”138 Accordingly, its analysis “focuse[d] on the statute’s
plain text.”139 Similarly, in Munksgard, the Eleventh Circuit
assessed the definitions of the verb “use” in both standard
English-language dictionaries and legal dictionaries, ultimately
concluding that the term “does not bear some idiosyncratic connotation in the legal context.”140 Using these two types of dictionaries, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the definitions
stating “[to] take, hold, or deploy (something) as a means of accomplishing or achieving something,”141 as well as “[t]o employ for
the accomplishment of some purpose”142 supported its argument
that impersonation is not necessary.
Turning to an analogous case that has wrangled with similar
statutory language helps this analysis. In Smith, the Supreme
Court faced a similar issue when interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924,
which criminalizes and establishes a minimum sentence for the
135

Miller, 734 F.3d at 540 (quoting Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145 (alteration in original)).
Id. at 540–41 (quoting Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145).
137 See Berroa, 856 F.3d at 156.
138 Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d at 607 (quoting Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 652 (alteration
in original)).
139 Id.
140 Munksgard, 913 F.3d at 1334.
141 Id. (quoting Use, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (3d ed. 2010)).
142 Id. (quoting Use, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (alteration in original)).
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“use[ ]” of a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.”143 The Court examined whether
the exchange of a gun for narcotics constituted “use” of a firearm
during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime within the
meaning of the statute.144 The petitioner argued that the penalty
for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking
offense covered only situations in which the firearm was used as
a weapon.145 That is, the petitioner argued that the provision
“d[id] not extend to defendants who use[d] a firearm solely as a
medium of exchange or for barter.”146
The Court ruled against the petitioner and held that “using a
firearm in a guns-for-drugs trade may constitute ‘us[ing] a firearm’ within the meaning of § 924(c)(1).”147 Specifically, the Court
examined the following before arriving at its conclusion: (1) the
broad ordinary meaning of “use,” (2) the United States
Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, and (3) the remaining terminology present in § 924(c)(1).148 Smith confirms the
availability of an unambiguously expansive notion of “use” in a
criminal context and therefore strongly supports a more expansive view of the term “uses” in the analogous aggravated identity
theft context. 149
The ruling in Smith is comparable and is, at least plausibly,
a reflection on the Court’s approach to textual interpretation. It
is also worth noting, however, that the dissenting opinion in
Smith argued that “[t]o use an instrumentality ordinarily means
to use it for its intended purpose” and provided an example:

143

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
See Smith, 508 U.S. at 227–37.
145 Id. at 227.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 237 (alteration in original).
148 See id. at 228–34.
149 In Bailey v. United States, however, the Court limited the reach of this view by
interpreting that § 924(c)(1) required “active employment” of the firearm by a defendant—
that is, “a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.” Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court implicitly overruled
Smith in this regard, with the sentiments in Bailey falling in line with those from Scalia’s
dissent in Smith (discussed above). Nonetheless, Bailey still leads to an expansive notion
of “use” in the context of aggravated identity theft. The use of personal information in an
identity fraud scheme, regardless of whether said use involves impersonation, is always
an “operative factor” in relation to carrying out the predicate offense. In other words, active employment of personal information does not necessarily nor exclusively implicate
impersonation; personal information in an identity fraud scheme is inherently central in
furthering a perpetrator’s goals, notwithstanding specific methods of use (i.e., impersonation versus general use).
144
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When someone asks, “Do you use a cane?,” he is not inquiring
whether you have your grandfather’s silver-handled walking
stick on display in the hall; he wants to know whether you
walk with a cane. Similarly, to speak of “using a firearm” is
to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a
weapon.150
This argument is reminiscent of the arguments from the impersonation camp that posit that the aggravated identity theft provision inherently requires that the defendant have impersonated
another person. The resultant ambiguity stems from whether the
use of a means of identification necessarily entails the assumption or misappropriation of the identity itself for its “intended
purpose.” In other words, one could reasonably argue that the use
of a means of identification to generally facilitate fraud is not the
most natural meaning of identity theft.
Despite this competing perspective, the majority’s analysis in
Smith, combined with other tools of construction, ultimately supports an argument that the provision is not grievously ambiguous
and that the language at hand cuts in favor of a broader interpretation. Still, the ideas in the dissent suggest that the analysis
should not stop here. Thus, while Smith does not definitively resolve the circuit split, the Court’s approach to “uses” markedly
tips the scales in favor of the majority’s broad approach to the
aggravated identity theft provision.
2. Interpretive canons and (con)textual tiebreakers.
When plain and ordinary meaning analyses are potentially
inconclusive, judges often turn to canons of statutory interpretation to help discern meaning. In the case of the aggravated identity theft provision, the canon of surplusage is particularly useful.
Under the surplusage canon, courts should “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute” in a way that “no clause,
sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”151
As a preliminary matter, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “trans-
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Smith, 508 U.S. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955); and then quoting Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101
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fer” as “[t]o convey or remove from one place or one person to another,” or “to change over the possession or control of,”152 while the
definition of “possess” is “[t]o have in one’s actual control.”153
To give full effect to “uses” and to avoid duplicating the meaning of the other terms, “uses” should take on a definition that captures all of the remaining concepts not addressed by the preceding
terms. In a strict sense, “transfers” and “possesses” are types of
use and thereby necessarily implicate “uses.” As such, the explicit
distinction between “transfers,” “possesses,” and “uses” cuts in favor of granting “uses” a meaning that expands beyond that of its
two companion verbs so as to avoid overlapping denotations. In
effect, limiting “uses” to direct impersonation restricts the term
to a definition that is already captured in “transfers” and “possesses.” Specifically, direct impersonation involves a transfer of a
means of identification from the victim to the impersonator and
the impersonator’s possession of those means. This nexus of victim-to-impersonator transfer and direct exchange of control, however, is not always present in the general-misuse cases that
courts in the majority camp discuss. Put another way, the idea of
direct impersonation is already covered by the preceding terms,
so “uses” must go beyond this existent realm of coverage to include more general use in crime facilitation.
The surplusage canon mitigates the Sixth Circuit’s concern
in Miller that without the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem
generis, there would be no limiting principle to the interpretation
of “uses.” Recall that in Miller the court employed two particular
canons to interpret the aggravated identity theft provision. First,
it applied the canon of noscitur a sociis, which instructs that “the
meaning of an unclear word or phrase . . . should be determined
by the words immediately surrounding it.”154 Second, it applied
the canon of ejusdem generis, which instructs that “when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or
phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class
as those listed.”155
The Sixth Circuit in Miller reasoned that the principles of
noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis supported a narrower notion of the provision, but it failed to consider the implications of
surplusage. The court noted that “the broad, dictionary definition
152
153
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of ‘uses’ is narrowed by its placement near and after ‘transfers’
and ‘possesses,’ both of which are specific kinds of use.”156 Therefore, the defendant “persuasively argue[d] that . . . ‘uses’ is not as
expansive as the government suggest[ed] and that the term must
have practical boundaries.”157 Overall, the tension between the
canon of surplusage and those employed by the Sixth Circuit
highlights the “back-and-forth” of competing canons that can occur during statutory interpretation.158
On balance, however, it should not necessarily follow that the
commonalities between the verbs “transfer,” “possess,” and “use”
necessarily result in a definitional restriction. This is because the
surplusage canon, when assessed alongside legislative context,
leads to a more tenable outcome. Considering the historical development of the ITADA and the ITPEA and the issues posed by the
Information Age, it is likely that Congress intended “uses” to capture actions far beyond unlawful transfers and possessions of
another person’s identifying information,159 advancing a reading
under the surplusage canon. Recognizing that rising technologies
would facilitate more identity crimes through complex fraud
schemes, Congress sought ways to combat the plethora of new
risks that went beyond traditional “dumpster diving” identity
theft and, implicitly, classical instances of direct impersonation.160
When read alongside interpretive canons, this history pairs the
best with the surplusage canon and is more hostile to canons that
would narrow the scope of coverage of the proscribed behavior for
a statute passed when new opportunities for identity crime were
rapidly increasing. In this way, legislative history and intent
break the tie between the competing canons: the surplusage
canon leads to a broader reading while the canons employed by
the Sixth Circuit lead to a narrower result, but legislative considerations counsel that the former is a more harmonizing point
of view.
156

Miller, 734 F.3d at 541 (emphasis in original).
Id.
158 See Stephen Ferro, Comment, It’s All About (Re)location: Interpreting the Federal
Sentencing Enhancement for Relocating a Fraudulent Scheme, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465,
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VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950))).
159 Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 108-528, at 4–5, as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780–81
(providing examples of how information originally gathered for authorized purposes can
be stolen through hacking and other technological means).
160 See id.
157

2022]

What’s the Use?

1317

With that said, the surplusage canon also quells auxiliary issues arising under the title-and-headings canon. Under this interpretive principle, a legislative act’s titles and headings are all
“useful navigational aids”161 and “‘tools available for the resolution of a doubt’ about the meaning of a statute.”162 The official title
associated with the identity fraud provision of the ITADA is
“Fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents, authentication features, and information.”163 The official
title associated with its ITPEA counterpart, the aggravated identity theft provision, is “Aggravated identity theft.”164
In this situation, one could initially argue that the differences
between the titles of the identity fraud provision and the aggravated identity theft provision suggest an underlying conceptual
divide between fraud (i.e., generally misusing a person’s identity)
and theft (i.e., impersonating another person). Thus, if a court
were to find the respective titles determinative, the meaning of
“use” in the latter statute would likely align with a more traditional understanding of theft. According to this premise, the titleand-headings canon would cut in favor of the impersonation
camp. However, other factors suggest that this cannot be the case.
The statute itself already includes the terms “transfers” and “possesses,” so to read the title as limiting the statute to only impersonation would conflict with its very content. Furthermore, it is
commonplace in Supreme Court jurisprudence that titles and
headings generally will not be dispositive where there are more
easily discernible indicators of meaning.165 With the cogent textual interpretation above, the title-and-headings canon fails to
overcome this presumption and—like noscitur a sociis and
ejusdem generis—cannot compete against the surplusage canon
and the clear implications of legislative history.

161 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 221 (2012).
162 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (quoting
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1947)).
163 18 U.S.C. § 1028.
164 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.
165 See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 331 U.S. at 528 (“[H]eadings and titles
are not meant to take the place of the detailed provisions of the text.”); Yates v. United
States, 574 U.S. 528, 552 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Titles, of course, are [ ] not dispositive.”).

1318

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:5

B. The Amendment Notes to the ITPEA
The textual analysis above demonstrates that the plain
meaning of “uses” cuts in favor of a broader interpretation of the
aggravated identity theft provision. The analysis also leads to two
additional observations. First, Congress used both the terms
“identity fraud” and “identity theft” in reports and commentary.
Some may argue that the surface-level distinction means that the
aggravated identity theft provision should only cover impersonation, not general misuse. However, Congress likely used these
terms to refer more broadly to the use of personal information to
facilitate or perpetuate fraud given the language of the House
Report and amendment notes to the ITPEA. Accordingly, the facial differentiation between the terms “identity fraud” and “identity theft” in the titles has little bearing.
Second, the fact that the aggravated identity theft provision
imposes a mandatory penalty enhancement provides a helpful
clue regarding congressional intent. The mandatory minimum
sentencing associated with the aggravated identity theft provision reflects Congress’s concern with high-stakes identity theft
recidivism as well as its ambivalence toward the consistent application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. This suggests that
Congress intended for the provision to cover instances of identity
crime beyond impersonation in order to have sufficient deterrent
effects in an increasingly digital environment.
1. References to identity fraud and theft.
Thus far, the ambiguity between identity fraud and identity
theft has been lurking underneath this line of analysis. In FloresFigueroa, the Supreme Court noted in a slightly different context
that identity fraud focuses on the “use of a false ID” while identity
theft focuses on the “use of an ID belonging to someone else.”166
The Court observed that Congress might have meant for the statute to cover only identity theft by “separat[ing] the fraud crime
from the theft crime in the statute itself.”167 However, the Court
also speculated that Congress might have meant for the statute
to cover both identity theft and fraud by equating the terms in
legislative documents.168

166
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Id.
Id.

2022]

What’s the Use?

1319

The House Report and amendment notes to the ITPEA provide useful information on the matter. Critically, the first sentence of the statement of purpose for the ITPEA states only that
the Act “addresses the growing problem of identity theft.”169 In
later sections, however, the House Report refers to the fact that
the legislation addresses both identity fraud and identity theft
without distinguishing between the two. For example, it explicitly
states that “[t]he terms ‘identity theft’ and ‘identity fraud’ refer to
all types of crimes in which someone wrongfully obtains and uses
another person’s personal data in some way that involves fraud
or deception, typically for economic or other gain, including immigration benefits.”170 In addition, the chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security expressed that “[i]dentity theft and identity
fraud are terms used to refer to all types of crimes in which an
individual’s personal or financial data is misused, typically for
economic gain or to facilitate another criminal activity.”171
Given these assertions, Congress used the initial phrase
“identity theft” as a signal to include the traditional notions of
both theft and fraud. More specifically, Congress used the initial
phrase to refer to the use of personal information both to impersonate another and to facilitate fraud. In other words, Congress
likely attributed the technical definition of identity fraud to identity theft in the statement of purpose. This effaces the differences
between the titles of the identity fraud provision and the aggravated identity theft provision, minimizing the residual challenge
that the title-and-headings canon poses to a more expansive notion of theft.
That being said, other portions of the House Report shed additional light on Congress’s conceptualization of identity theft. In
particular, Congress expressed its concern that “many perpetrators of identity theft receive[d] little or no prison time.”172 It believed that the minimal severity of punishment became a “tacit
encouragement to those arrested to continue to pursue such

169

H.R. REP. NO. 108-528, at 3, as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 779.
Id. at 4, as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780.
171 Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, and the Identity Theft Investigation and
Prosecution Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1731 and H.R. 3693 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1
(2004) (statement of Rep. Howard Coble, Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec.).
172 H.R. REP. NO. 108-528, at 5, as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 781.
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crimes.”173 Congress then presented eight examples of these situations, each of which were examples of more traditional, restrictive notions of identity theft that involved direct impersonation.
For example, they included the following story:
William K. Maxfield used the Social Security number of a
William E. Maxfield (no relation) to obtain loans and lines of
credit. He was able to obtain the false Social Security number
through his employment at an auto dealership. Maxfield
defaulted on some of the loans but was timely on others. Ultimately, most of the lenders were paid; however, the more
significant injury was to William E. Maxfield, who suffered
harm to his credit rating and had great difficulty in clearing
what appeared to be delinquent accounts. On January 9,
2003, William K. Maxfield was sentenced to 10 months imprisonment.174
Courts that have weighed in on the matter have generally commented that all eight examples primarily involve the defendant’s
impersonation of the victim.175 Put another way, none of the examples describe instances of general misuse of personal information.
However, the fact that the eight examples in the House Report primarily involve impersonation does not affect the outcome
of this analysis for two main reasons. First, in the preceding paragraphs, Congress described how “identity thieves” were gaining
access to personal information in the normal course of business
as well as through hacking.176 Immediately thereafter, Congress
provided an example of such a “thief” who engaged in identity
theft and identity fraud by accessing customer information
through his position at a computer software company.177 Congress
also discussed a fraud ring that had supplied fraudulent Social
Security cards, a criminal operation that did not necessarily implicate direct impersonation of another person.178 In doing so, both
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Id.
Id. at 6, as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 782.
175 See, e.g., Berroa, 856 F.3d at 156 (“The report goes on to provide several examples
of identity theft. Notably, each of these examples involved the defendant’s use of personal
information to pass him or herself off as another person, or the transfer of such information to a third party for use in a similar manner.”).
176 H.R. REP. NO. 108-528, at 4–5, as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780–81.
177 See id. at 5, as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 781.
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identity-crime concepts were prevalent in this legislative discussion, with Congress ultimately cautioning that “[t]he insider
threat from identity theft and identity fraud is a threat to personal security as well as national security.”179
Second, as noted, the House Report explicitly stated that the
eight examples were of identity theft to highlight that minimal
prison sentences were “tacit encouragement” for individuals to become repeat offenders.180 Evidenced above, Congress’s use of terminology was inconsistent throughout the House Report.
However, this is an instance in which Congress implicitly extended the notion of impersonation to also cover identity fraud.
Congress’s primary aim in providing the eight examples was to
explain how prior law failed to address recidivism by providing
inadequate deterrence effects. To further this aim, it had to call
attention to real-world scenarios that illustrated sizable gaps between offenses and degrees of punishment.
Notably, instances of disproportionately small punishments
for identity crimes are much more likely to fall under impersonation cases. This is because general fraud-facilitation cases more
often implicate other areas of the law and trigger additional
charges that lead to longer sentences. With this in mind,
Congress cherry-picked scenarios to suit its needs, such as the one
mentioned above that displayed how William K. Maxfield’s violations resulted in a sentence of only ten months. Hence, examples
that focused on impersonation were likely more valuable for the
overarching demonstrative purpose related to the proportionality
of the punishment. Therefore, the use of different terms in the
titles likely has little bearing as various statements in the record
suggest that Congress attempted to cover both identity theft and
fraud under the ITPEA.
2. Mandatory penalty enhancements.
Another consideration in this analysis is the fact that the aggravated identity theft provision is a mandatory penalty enhancement, which has implications for interpreting congressional
intent. Recall that under § 1028A(a)(1), a violation of the aggravated identity theft provision mandates a two-year consecutive
penalty enhancement; this penalty enhancement is in addition to
any term of imprisonment for the underlying offense enumerated
179
180
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in the provision.181 The provision expressly prohibits a judge from
ordering the sentence to run concurrently with that of the underlying offense.182 It also prohibits the court from sentencing a convicted defendant to probation183 and from reducing the underlying
term of imprisonment.184
Taken as a whole, the mandatory minimum sentences associated with § 1028A reflect Congress’s concern with high-stakes
identity theft recidivism as well as its frustration with the inconsistent application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.185 Still,
it is valuable to keep in mind the recent proliferation in the application of the aggravated identity theft provision. According to
the United States Sentencing Commission, “the percentage of
identity theft offenders convicted under section 1028A has steadily increased since shortly after the statute was enacted, more
than doubling from 21.9 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 53.4 percent in fiscal year 2016.”186 Furthermore, “[s]ection 1028A aggravated identity theft offenses also increased as a portion of all offenses carrying mandatory minimum penalties. Section 1028A
offenses accounted for 7.2 percent of offenses carrying a mandatory minimum penalty in fiscal year 2016, increasing from
4.0 percent in 2010.”187
Given this uptick and the general severity associated with a
mandatory consecutive penalty enhancement, some may argue
that a broader reading of the provision would result in its application to situations beyond which Congress had originally contemplated, resulting in a relatively punitive interpretation. That
is, less harmful misuse of personal information is potentially
more common in today’s technological environment, and some
may fear that such minor misuses might implicate the statute
and result in disproportionate punishments relative to the
offenses.
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183 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(1).
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There are several responses to these concerns. First, the fact
that the use of a means of identification must occur “during and
in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c)”
limits the concern of overapplication.188 The predicate felonies
limit and anchor the aggravated identity theft provision to situations that have already triggered provisions that proscribe more
severe conduct such as embezzlement, bank and medical fraud,
and false personation in Social Security contexts. Accordingly,
more commonplace misusers of personal identifying information
will not be subjected to the possibility of a penalty enhancement.
For example, someone’s use of another person’s picture on a social
media profile—while potentially compromising that person’s public image and privacy interests—will not necessarily trigger the
statute.
Second, when analyzed against the backdrop of the enactment of the ITPEA, the aggravated identity provision aptly serves
as a measure to combat the sweeping issues that arose as a result
of the Information Age. With this technological evolution came
additional avenues for identity crimes, creating opportunities for
criminal activity in contexts such as online banking and digital
transfers of confidential data. To rid the provision of its broader
reach would impermissibly counteract Congress’s aim of protecting helpless consumers in an evolving computer-driven society.
This is not to say that the imposition of mandatory minimums alone meant that Congress wanted a broad reading of
“uses.” Rather, given the aforementioned legislative history regarding contemporaneous changes in technology, Congress likely
implemented the mandatory minimums knowing at the outset
the wide scope of coverage that its reactive law would take on.
Further, people are increasingly expected to offer their personal
information online—be it for their jobs, for browsing websites that
track data usage, or for signing up for digital subscriptions.
Therefore, the mandatory minimum sentences associated with
the aggravated identity theft provision not only act as strong deterrents for the actors who caused a total of $56 billion in losses
to U.S. consumers in 2020,189 but also embodies Congress’s intent
to guide and protect average consumers in a potentially hostile
space that increasingly threatens financial harm and dire reputational costs.
188

See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
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JAVELIN STRATEGY & RSCH. (Mar. 23, 2021), https://perma.cc/AVF8-A9FR.
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C. The Impropriety of the Rule of Lenity
The application of the rule of lenity is improper in the context
of the aggravated identity theft provision. Under the judicial doctrine of the rule of lenity, “a court, in construing an ambiguous
criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient
punishment.”190 This doctrine is related to the notion of fair-warning challenges, which states that “no one should be held criminally liable for conduct that he or she could not reasonably
understand to be prohibited.”191
The aggravated identity theft provision—and particularly
the role of “uses”—does not rise to a level of grievous ambiguity
so as to trigger the rule of lenity. Legal scholars have characterized the doctrine as a “last resort” that is subjugated to other
indicators of meaning.192 Further, “[t]he mere possibility of articulating a narrower construction [ ] does not by itself make the rule
of lenity applicable.”193 In this case, a variety of interpretative
tools are available and operative. The Fourth Circuit, among others, has provided an analytical backdrop that explains the broad
plain meaning of the term194 consistent with the textual analysis
conducted in this Comment. Moreover, an analogous case that
has wrangled with similar statutory language arrived at the same
conclusion.195 In addition, the surplusage canon counters the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, granting “uses” a
differentiated meaning so as to not encroach upon the definitional
territory of the other two verbs in the statute.
The amendment notes to the ITPEA support the outcome of
this Comment’s textual analysis: the meaning of the aggravated
identity theft provision is unambiguous, though broad. Initially,

190

Rule of lenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Fair-warning challenge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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the title-and-headings canon posed auxiliary issues for the general-misuse camp. Specifically, the differences between the titles
of the identity fraud provision and the aggravated identity theft
provision could have suggested an underlying conceptual divide
between fraud and theft. Given the assertions in the House
Report, however, Congress likely used these terms to refer to the
use of personal information to perpetuate or facilitate fraud.196
And although the eight listed examples primarily involve impersonation, they serve a particular illustrative purpose that does
not affect the meaning of “uses” and thus carry little weight.
Moreover, as a matter of policy, the enumeration of specific
categories of predicate felonies alleviates any concern that a
broad reading of “uses” would result in the statute’s application
to situations beyond what Congress intended. This is because the
statute limits the punishment to actions that occur during or in
relation to said predicate offenses, which cabins liability to more
serious offenders.197 Taken as a whole, these factors suggest that
the term “uses” in § 1028A should take on a broader meaning to
encompass the use of means of identification in the general facilitation of fraud, a tenable outcome as a matter of plain meaning,
legislative considerations, and policy.
IV. ADVANTAGES OF THE MAJORITY APPROACH IN PRACTICE
This final Part illustrates the advantages of the majority approach in practice. Under the general-misuse interpretation, the
term is not ambiguous and the rule of lenity does not apply. As
such, the defendant need only generally misuse another’s information in the facilitation of fraud. With this approach, courts are
better equipped to assess the aggravated identity theft provision
in more modern, technological contexts. Accordingly, the following sections examine the benefits of relying on the unambiguous,
though broad, meaning of the aggravated identity theft provision,
specifically in the contexts of digital political dissent and vigilante
hacktivism in online ecosystems.
A. Applications in Digital Political Dissent
The general-misuse approach is beneficial in the contexts of
digital political dissent and hacking. As a general primer, hacking
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falls into the categories of black-hat, white-hat, or grey-hat hacking.198 Black-hat hacking, or malicious hacking, involves an illegal
attempt to gain access to a computer system.199 White-hat hacking, or ethical hacking, involves an authorized attempt to gain
unauthorized access to a computer system to help assess security
vulnerabilities.200 Grey-hat hacking involves a mix of black hat
hacking and white hat hacking.201 This practice exposes security
vulnerabilities without self-serving motivations, but hackers often do so through illegal methods.202
In cases that involve fraud schemes that implicate impersonation, both the general-misuse and impersonation approaches
cover the proscribed conduct. For example, in United States v.
Hammond,203 Hammond engaged in both black-hat and grey-hat
hacking. Beginning in 2011, Hammond mounted a cyber assault
on Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (“Stratfor”), an information
analysis company.204 In the process, he stole confidential information including “approximately 60,000 credit card numbers and
associated data belonging to clients of Stratfor” and “records for
approximately 860,000 Stratfor clients, including individual user
IDs, usernames, encrypted passwords, and email addresses.”205
The defendant then publicly disclosed stolen data that arguably shed light on the corruption of Stratfor, including bribery,
insider trading, and corrupt connections with large corporations
and government agencies.206 He also “used some of the stolen
credit card data to make at least $700,000 worth of unauthorized
charges,”207 including “large donations to charities and nonprofits.”208 In addition to pleading guilty for conspiracy to violate the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,209 the defendant was indicted for
aggravated identity theft. 210 He was ultimately sentenced to ten
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years in federal prison.211 Given that the credit card fraud implicated impersonation, both the general-misuse and impersonation
approaches would support adding the two-year sentencing enhancement in this scenario.
However, consider an alternative situation in which
Hammond—now less technologically sophisticated in his individual capacity—did not use the stolen credit card data to make unauthorized charges. Instead, he facilitated a third-party hacking
collective’s attempt to gain access and to hold Stratfor’s client
data hostage until Stratfor vowed to change its corrupt behavior
for the public good. As a threat, he communicated to Stratfor that
if it did not comply, he would tell the third party to release all of
Stratfor’s clients’ data on an online forum. Not only would this
cause lethal reputational harm to Stratfor, it would also destroy
the financial standing of Stratfor’s individual clients; however,
Hammond believed that this was a necessary risk and sacrifice to
achieve his broader aims. Under this set of facts, Hammond
would have used the personal identifying information in furtherance of his general goal of shedding light on Stratfor’s corrupt
practices.
Here, the impersonation approach would not have reached
Hammond’s own conduct, given that he was not impersonating
any of the owners of the data that he was holding hostage. Moreover, he would not have been directly transferring or possessing
the means of identification himself. Therefore, the general-misuse approach would better address this situation by enhancing
penalties for Hammond’s behavior given the risk of personal loss
via the leaked information. This scheme to hold means of identification hostage is the type of action that Congress wanted to proscribe during the technology boom of the early 2000s.212 The
centrality of the personal information to the scheme—evidenced
by Hammond’s threat to release the data—is an exemplary manifestation of Congress’s fear of consumer harm. This concern is
particularly apparent in this situation given that a third party,
with Hammond’s facilitation, misappropriated the personal infor-
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Kopfstein, supra note 208.
In a strict sense, one could construe this isolated action as possession. As a practical matter, however, courts are largely unwillingly to read possession alone as implicating the aggravated identity theft provision, resorting to the more general definitional
space captured by “uses.” See generally Part II. Consequently, a shift to a broader understanding of statutory language becomes necessary in situations that sit squarely within
the textual confines and purpose of the statute.
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mation of 860,000 individuals—an astonishing figure that highlights the ease and efficiency with which contemporary wrongdoers can improperly access and compromise data. As such, the
majority approach aptly accounts for the root of the harms to financial reputation and personal inconveniences that very likely
would have occurred in this alternative fact pattern.213
B. Predicate Felonies as a Safeguard
The general-misuse approach is particularly valuable in borderline cases that stretch the traditional concept of “use.” In such
situations, the perpetrator utilizes the means of identification
neither to impersonate nor to act on behalf of another. For example, after Hammond, Barrett Brown—a journalist and online
activist—copied and pasted a public link to the Stratfor Hack documents in an internet chat channel entitled #ProjectPM, “a
crowd-sourced think tank that focuses on government intelligence
contractors.”214 A fervent spokesperson of hacktivist collective
Anonymous, he supported the Stratfor Hack and later uploaded a
YouTube video in which he threatened an FBI agent assigned to
the matter.215
In addition to charging Brown for the various predicate offenses, the government indicted Brown for aggravated identity
theft for using the “means of identifying ten individuals in Texas,
Florida, and Arizona, in the form of their credit card numbers and
the corresponding CVVs for authentication as well as personal
addresses and other contact information.”216 In response, some
commentators have argued that the application of the aggravated
identity theft provision in such cases may have detrimental ef-

213 Conspiratorial data-hostage and ethical-hacking situations like this example are
relatively common in contemporary computer ecosystems; modern ransomware capabilities have made this technology a compelling route for pecuniary or political gain by both
state and nonstate actors through online civil disobedience, hacktivism, counterhacking,
and whistleblowing. See MAURUSHAT, supra note 198, at 7–9. In her work, Professor Alana
Maurushat documented over two hundred high-profile ethical hacking incidents that occurred from 1999 to 2018 carried out by major vigilante groups from around the world. See
MAURUSHAT, supra note 198, at 57–95.
214 Kristin Bergman, Adding up to 105: The Charges Against Barrett Brown, DIGIT.
MEDIA L. PROJECT (Aug. 6, 2013), https://perma.cc/4S95-PM28.
215 See id.; see also Philip F. DiSanto, Note, Blurred Lines of Identity Crimes:
Intersection of the First Amendment and Federal Identity Fraud, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 941,
942–43 (2015).
216 Bergman, supra note 214.
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fects on free speech for reporters using digital channels of communication.217 Specifically, some scholarship suggests that courts
should heighten the requisite mens rea in these situations by requiring intent that personal information be used for malicious
purposes.218
Even in borderline cases, however, courts should apply the
aggravated identity theft provision in accordance with the broad
plain meaning of the text. Given the relative rarity of journalists
who commit the predicate felonies enumerated in the statute,
there will likely be minimal “dire consequences for press freedom”219 that would justify a heightened state of mental culpability
that others have suggested.220 The vast majority of reporters do
not commit predicate felonies while engaging in their journalistic
activities and therefore will likely not meet Brown’s fate. This bypasses concerns about free-speech-chilling effects. Thus, as long
as an underlying offense is present, courts should continue to apply the aggravated identity theft provision even in cases in which
the defendant’s use of the personal information is relatively distant from the “actual” fraud. This reading best reflects the statute’s main purpose of protecting consumers and companies from
financial and reputational losses that would occur regardless of
whether the perpetrator intended said losses.

217 See, e.g., DiSanto, supra note 215, at 954 (“[C]ommentators and civil rights organizations have referred to the government’s interpretation of §§ 1028 and 1028A as
troubling for news organizations and journalists that do not fall within traditional definitions.”); Hanni Fakhoury & Trevor Timm, Barrett Brown Prosecution Threatens Right to
Link, Could Criminalize Routine Journalism Practices, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 19,
2013), https://perma.cc/4S4K-NA6H (“While one would assume linking to the list is a First
Amendment-protected activity—given the journalists had nothing to do with stealing the
passwords—Barrett Brown is currently under indictment, in part, for remarkably similar
behavior. And if he is convicted, it could have dire consequences for press freedom.”).
218 DiSanto, supra note 215, at 979.
219 Fakhoury & Timm, supra note 217.
220 There are other types of digital journalism, however, that may face more consequences related to press freedom than the instant cases. For example, Julian Assange, the
founder of WikiLeaks, was indicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 973, and 1030 for disclosing
national defense information and conspiring to commit computer intrusion. See In re
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press to Unseal Crim. Prosecution of Assange, 357
F. Supp. 3d 528 (E.D. Va. 2019). If Assange’s actions had involved the means of identification of another person and he had been charged under the aggravated identity theft
provision, then the situation would have implicated issues concerning the First Amendment, the public and journalistic interests in the unfettered communication of information, classified information, and national security, which are outside the scope of this
Comment.
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CONCLUSION
To summarize, it is improper to reach the rule of lenity because the aggravated identity theft provision is unambiguous and
because there are practical advantages to the general-misuse approach. When enacting the ITADA, Congress sought to develop
and expand its legislation regarding identity theft and fraud to
adapt to a changing social and technological environment. The
legislation’s ultimate shortcomings led Congress to bolster identity theft and fraud laws through the ITPEA, addressing concerns
over recidivism.
In addition to the outcome of the textual analysis, courts in
comparable situations have similarly focused on the broad ordinary meaning of the term “uses.” Furthermore, the surplusage
canon counters the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, granting “uses” a meaning that prevents it from duplicating
the meaning of the other two verbs in the provision. Moreover,
the House Report and amendment notes to the ITPEA suggest
that the use of the different terms “identity fraud” and “identity
theft” in these statutes has little bearing on the meaning of
§ 1028A. As a matter of policy, the construction of the aggravated
identity theft provision itself—with the penalty enhancements
anchored in enumerated predicate felonies—quells the concerns
that a broad reading of the provision would result in its application to situations beyond which Congress had originally
contemplated.
Finally, the practical advantages of the general-misuse approach are especially apparent in a technological context. Under
the general-misuse interpretation, where the defendant need only
generally misuse another’s information in the facilitation of
fraud, courts are ultimately better equipped to apply the aggravated identity theft provision in contexts including digital political dissent and hacktivist activities.

